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DEVELOPMENT REPORT
Unitization for portability of emergency 
response surveillance robot system: experiences 
and lessons learned from the deployment 
of the JAEA-3 emergency response robot at the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants
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Abstract 
It was cleared that transportability of emergency response robots system had been very important. Therefore, RESQ 
series robots, which were developed by Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (present, Japan Atomic Energy Agency: 
JAEA), were installed or stored in containers for easy transportation to the accident site. After Fukushima Daiichi NPPs’ 
accidents occurred, JAEA modified a RESQ-A robot in order to meet the situation of the accidents with consideration of 
transportation. However, actual situation was beyond the anticipation, and unitization was required to deploy JAEA-3 
robot to Fukushima daiichi NPPs. The actual confused situation was many rubble were scattered and temporary cables 
and hoses were constructed in the reactor buildings, so that reconnaissance robots should be conveyed by opera-
tors through limited route, should be reassembled in short time. JAEA modified again in order to unitize JAEA-3 robot 
system in Fukushima daiichi NPPs. It was lesson learned that emergency response robot system needed to be unitized 
for increase of portability, and that “Unitization policy for emergency response robot system” was developed.
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Background
Development of nuclear emergency response robots 
after the JCO criticality accident
The JCO criticality accident occurred on September 
30, 1999 when technicians making nuclear fuel using 
unapproved processes, poured too much around 20% 
enriched uranium nitrate into a precipitation tank. Stop-
ping the criticality subjected workers to higher than nor-
mally approved radiation doses and it was recognized 
that nuclear emergency response robots were needed to 
respond to future accidents.
Three organizations developed nuclear emergency 
response robots: Nuclear Safety Technology Center, 
Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute [JAERI, now 
reorganized to Japan Atomic Energy Agency, (JAEA)], 
and Manufacturing Science and Technology Center 
(MSTC). The Nuclear Safety Technology Center devel-
oped the Monirobo-A and Monirobo-B for outdoors 
reconnaissance [1]. JAERI developed the RESQ series 
robots which included two RESQ-A, a RESQ-B, a RESQ-
C, and a RaBOT for indoors reconnaissance [2, 3]. MSTC 
developed the SMERT-K, SMERT-M, SWAN, MARS-A, 
MARS-T, and MENHIR robots for indoor tasks [4, 5].
It was also recognized that it is important that the 
nuclear response robots can be immediately trans-
ported to the accident site. The outdoor reconnaissance 
robots were designed to be stored in a transport and 
control vehicle. The transport and control vehicle deliv-
ers the robots to the site and the robots are controlled 
from inside the vehicle. The indoor reconnaissance and 
task robots were designed to be stored and transported 
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in containers. For the indoor reconnaissance and task 
robots there were additional containers for storage and 
transportation of the control systems. The containers 
were also designed to be the operator stations. For exam-
ple, a RESQ system consisted of two containers (Fig.  1) 
with the two RESQ-A (Fig.  2), the RESQ-B (Fig.  3), the 
RESQ-C (Fig. 4), the robot controls, and accessory items. 
The list of accessory items included two diesel generators 
(Fig.  5). It was expected that the containerized systems 
could be delivered to the accident site as soon as trucks, 
trailers, and drivers could be arranged.    
JAEA’s response to the Fukushima accident using nuclear 
emergency response robots
When the accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Plants (NPPs) occurred on March 11, 2011, the 
RESQ series robots were not mission ready. Due to lack 
of budget, the robots which were still stored in their 
Fig. 1 Container for RESQ robots
Fig. 2 RESQ-A robots
Fig. 3 RESQ-B robot
Fig. 4 RESQ-C robot
Fig. 5 Diesel drive electric generator
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containers were not maintained and there were no 
trained operators. The RaBOT robot had been aban-
doned. JAEA contacted the original manufacturer of the 
robot for help getting the RESQ robots operational. The 
original manufacturer was unable to support the need 
because their facilities had also been damaged by the 
earthquake and the original engineering was not acces-
sible. In addition, the original engineer was no longer 
with the company and since the RESQ robots were over 
10  years old, some components in the robots were no 
longer available. After the initial inability to get RESQ 
robots operational it became apparent that the RESQ 
robots would not have been suitable for the conditions 
at Fukushima.
In order to support the emergency efforts at Fuku-
shima, JAEA decided to modify the RESQ robots and a 
Brokk-40 robot which they also owned. The Brokk-40 
was modified to the JAEA-1 robot by adding a blade for 
moving concrete rubble created by the hydrogen explo-
sions. The blade was to be used to clear the way for 
small reconnaissance robots. To decontaminate floors in 
the reactor buildings, JAEA repaired and modified one 
RESQ-A robot to the JAEA-2. The main modification 
on JAEA-2 was a water sprayer. To detect hot spots on 
reactor building floors, the second RESQ-A was repaired 
and modified to the JAEA-3. The main modification on 
JAEA-3 was a gamma ray imaging and measurement 
device called Gamma Eye. JAEA also built robot con-
trol and transport vehicles RC-1 and RC-2. Each RC 
transports a robot and accessory components including 
a shielded operation box, area camera, radiation dose 
meter, a smaller gasoline drive generator, and so on [6, 
7] (Figs. 6, 7).
Preparation of the JAEA‑3 robot system
The JAEA-3 Robot system was prepared and which sys-
tem consisted of JAEA-3 robot, the newly developed 
Gamma Eye, and accessory components. The mission 
of the system was planned to find out the hot spot on 
the floor or wall of reactor buildings. Gamma Eye was 
designed to be remotely operated and to be small and 
light enough for small reconnaissance robots like JAEA-
3. Other modifications on the JAEA-3 robot were done to 
increase radiation resistance and to waterproof JAEA-3 
for water spray decontamination. To increase the radia-
tion resistance of JAEA-3, electronic circuits like servo 
drives were moved from the robot and into the control-
ler. Long cables connect the controller to JAEA-3. Mov-
ing electronic components from the robot to the robot 
controller increased the radiation resistance of JAEA-3 
robot by more than an order of ten thousand Sievert. 
High pressure water spray was planned for decontami-
nation of the robot itself and the robot was required to 
be waterproof. However the rubber cables and tires were 
expected to be difficult to decontaminate with high pres-
surize water, because small pores on the surface of the 
rubber would trap small particles of radioactive Cesium. 
Alternative tires and cables were prepared for use during 
maintenance to reduce radiation dose to the technicians. 
The alternative cable for maintenance was short, which 
made it easier to handle during maintenance.
The RC-2 was a tracked vehicle with: a remotely oper-
ated lift for robot deployment, a shielded operation BOX 
for reducing operators’ radiation exposure during robot 
operations, an area camera for easy robot operation, dose 
rate meter, a smaller gasoline generator with 100 VAC 
output, a 6 MPa water spray and so on. All components 
were installed or stored on the RC-2, to assure transport-
ability of the JAEA-3 robot and accessory components.
The modification and preparation was started at the 
beginning of May 2011, and was completed near the end 
Fig. 6 JAEA-3 robot equipped with gamma imaging and measure-
ment device
Fig. 7 Trial results of gamma imaging and measuring device
Page 4 of 7Kawatsuma et al. Robomech J  (2017) 4:6 
of May, and ready to deploy to unit 2 of the Fukushima 
Daiichi NPPs.
Unitizing and deployment of the JAEA‑3 robot
Actual situation and requirements for deployment 
at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants
During the modification of a RESQ-A robot to JAEA-3 
robot, knowledge of the actual situation at Fukushima 
Daiichi NPPs improved. The following observations 
drove new requirements:
  • The radiation level was so high the JAEA-3 operator 
would be exposed to, too much radiation if the robot 
control vehicle RC-2 is used in the truck-lock of unit 
2 of the Fukushima Daiichi NPPs.
  • In order to deploy JAEA-3 robot to survey for hot 
spots using Gamma Eye in unit 2 of the Fukushima 
Daiichi NPPs, operators would have to carry robot 
and accessory components from the turbine building 
to the reactor building.
  • There is a long corridor the from turbine building to 
reactor building where there were temporary cables 
and hoses that were used to stabilize and cool the 
reactor cores. A temporary walkway covered the 
cables and hoses and let operators walk over the 
cables and hoses.
  • The smallest opening was 700 mm wide × 700 mm 
high.
  • The floor of the turbine building was contaminated 
and components temporarily put on the floor while 
being transported through the building would 
become contaminated.
  • The turbine building did not have sufficient ventila-
tion for an internal combustion engine to be run 
inside the building.
  • Operations, including carrying units, disassembly, 
and reassembly, would require operators and techni-
cians to be in a radiation protection suit with full face 
mask for 3–4 h.
  • Disassembly and reassembly requiring special opera-
tor’s skill or tools would require more time that oper-
ators and technicians need to be in radiation protec-
tive gear.
  • A deployed robot would become contaminated.
Unitization policy for the JAEA‑3 robot system
The requirements for the JAEA-3 robot system became 
clearer and it was decided that the system should be uni-
tized to make it portable, with the following constraints:
  • Unitization should be completed in 1 month.
  • Support would not be available from the maker.
  • It would be difficult to procure special parts.
  • Each unit should weigh less than 25 or 35 kg, so that 
one operator could carry it.
  • Each unit should be smaller than 400  mm depth, 
600 mm width and 1000 mm high, to allow the unit 
to be carried through the 700 mm wide × 1000 mm 
high opening.
  • Each unit should fit on a three-wheel-carrier (Fig. 8) 
to limit the contamination of the unit and to make 
the units easier to carry and back pack.
  • Each unit should be assembled with waterproof con-
nectors and without special tools.
Units of the JAEA‑3 robot system
Unit 1
Consists of the area camera, a camera tripod, and a cable 
from the camera to the controller. JAEA-3 did not have 
a robot mounted camera, but the operator could watch 
JAEA-3 on the area camera while viewing the output of 
Gamma Eye. After the robot operational test, the opera-
tor could operate the robot using the area camera.
Unit 2
Consists of the man–machine interface (or control sta-
tion) components which includes: a joystick for robot 
operation, PC for control of Gamma Eye, and a monitor 
for the area camera. All these fit on a three wheel carrier 
for easy portability (Fig. 9).
In addition, servo drives for the motors of the JAEA-3 
robot were also located inside the control station. It 
was difficult to find servo drives compatible with the 
motors from the RESQ-A robot. Many servo drive sup-
pliers were affected by the earthquake and tsunami and 
were unable to provide servo drives to JAEA. Sawa-
mura Denki Corporation was able to supply servo drives 
which were almost completely compatible with the 
Fig. 8 Three wheel carrier
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JAEA-3 motors. These servo drives had low radiation 
resistance and it was decided the servo drives should be 
located in unit 2.
Unit 3
Unit 3 was a 50 m cable to connect the robot and the con-
troller. A single cable with all the conductors could not 
be manufactured in the short time frame. Several cables 
were tied together and covered by heat-shrink tube.
Unit 4
Unit-4 was a battery module instead of the gasoline gen-
erator to supply power. The battery module was rated for 
the motor surge currents, could be easily recharged, and 
powered the Gamma Eye and area cameras.
Unit 4 was the same type of lead-acid battery that 
is used in cars and an inverter to convert 12  VDC to 
100 VAC. All equipment was designed for 100 VAC.
Unit 0: JAEA‑3 robot equipped with Gamma Eye
The most difficult equipment to unitize was the JAEA-3 
robot equipped with the Gamma Eye, gamma ray imag-
ing and measuring device.
One option was to disassemble Gamma Eye from 
JAEA-3 and then reassemble the Gamma Eye to the 
robot. Reassembly would require making mechanical 
and electrical connections and then precisely aligning 
and adjusting Gamma Eye, while wearing one cotton 
glove and three rubber glove for radioactive contamina-
tion control. This is very difficult and would potentially 
expose the operators to high radiation doses.
The second option is not to disassemble the Gamma 
Eye from the JAEA-3 robot. The JAEA-3 with the Gamma 
Eye weighs around 70 kg and is twice the unitized weight 
goal of 25–35 kg. Despite the weight, this option was cho-
sen because of the benefits of lowering radiation doses. 
Because of the weight, it was also decided that two opera-
tors would carry the unit. Grips were added to JAEA-3 
for two operators to hold. Testing showed that there was 
a possibility of an operators’ hand slipping. If one per-
son loses their grip on the robot, their end of the robot 
could fall and the other operator could be injured by the 
suddenly shifting load. To prevent the robot from falling 
if an operator loses their grip, shoulder belts were added 
(Fig. 10).
The end result was that the original JAEA-3 system was 
divided into units 1, 2, 3, 4 and unit 0 (Figs. 11, 12) and 
Table 1.
Fig. 9 Controller, unit 2
Grip Shoulder Belt
Fig. 10 Added grips and removal shoulder belt
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Deployment of the JAEA‑3 robot system
The JAEA-3 robot system was deployed in unit 2 of the 
Fukushima Daiichi NPPs on Sep 23rd 2011, with assis-
tance from a Packbot robot instead of the Unit 1, area 
camera (Fig.  13) [8–10]. The purpose of the deploy-
ment was to find hot spots which were major gamma ray 
sources. JAEA-3 robot found that the block-out, a part 
of bio-shielding of primary containment vessel of unit-2, 
was uniformly releasing high levels of gamma rays. The 
block-out is concrete blocks piled and fixed by mortar 
without reinforcing steel rod, in order for easy access in 
the case of trouble.
By dividing the JAEA-3 robot system to five units, it 
was possible for operators to carry the units and deploy 
the robot.
Lessons learned
Importance of portability of nuclear emergency response 
robots
As mentioned above, it had been recognized that trans-
portability to an accident site was important. Portability 
of the robot which allows operators to carry the robot 
system into buildings for deployment is also recognized 
as important.
Emergency response robots and the process for deploy-
ing the robots should be considered as a system. The sys-
tem should consider storage in a robot control vehicle in 
order to allow immediate transportation to an accident 
site. By unitizing the system into units that can be carried 
by one or two operators the emergency response team 
can bypass obstacles like debris and stairs to deploy the 
robot deep inside a building.
Fig. 11 Unit 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4
Fig. 12 JAEA-3 robot system
Table 1 Contents of each unit
Unit no. Contents Remarks
0 JAEA-3 robot Equipped with “Gamma Eye”
1 Area camera Picture as shown in unit 2 on monitor
2 Controller Includes servo divers, camera control units 
and monitors and PC for gamma camera
3 Cable Consists of multi-line cable, a twisted pair 
cable and a stainless steel wire
4 Battery module Consists of two 12 V lead acid batteries and 
DC/AC inverter
Fig. 13 JAEA-3 robot being deployed in unit 2
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Development of a general unitization policy for portability 
of nuclear emergency response robot systems
Using the experience of unitizing JAEA-3 for transport-
ability and portability, a general policy of unitization for 
portability of nuclear emergency response robot sys-
tems has been developed. This policy should be con-
sidered when developing emergency response robot 
systems for use in environments with high radiation and 
contamination.
1. Divide the robot system including the robot itself and 
accessory components into units weighing less than 
25–35 kg, so that each unit could be carried by a sin-
gle operator.
2. Sometimes a unit weight of 35 kg or less is not possi-
ble. For unit weights of 35–70 kg, add hand holds and 
carry straps to allow two people to carry the unit. For 
unit weights over 70 kg, additional solutions should 
be evaluated.
3. Limit contamination of each unit to make decontam-
ination of the units easier. For example, units could 
be transported on a cart, so that contamination is 
limited to the cart wheels.
4. To minimize radiation dose to maintenance person-
nel, remove contaminated components that are not 
easily decontaminated. For example, temporarily 
replace the robot cable and wheels.
5. Units should be easy to reassemble without special 
tools. For example, tool free connectors could be 
used.
6. Avoid build-to-order parts or custom-made parts. 
Store common parts like tool free and waterproof 
connectors, so that operators can modify or optimize 
the system quickly.
Perspectives
The unitization policy would help the robot emergency 
response team immediately deploy a robot system in 
response to a nuclear emergency.
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